Contents

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Preface

This volume is the fifth one in our book series Visual Learning, based on a sequence of yearly conferences organized by the Budapest Visual Learning Lab (VLL – http://vll.mpt.bme.hu). Launched in October 2009 by the Department of Technical Education, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, the Lab is actually a research seminar with regular monthly meetings. I have provided a narrative of its development in the Preface to the first volume of the Visual Learning series, and have repeated and updated that narrative in the second volume. On the present occasion let me just point out, as I did in the Preface to the fourth volume, too, that taking up research directed at visual education was clearly in the tradition of the Department where, for quite some time already, methods of atypical learning had been intensively studied.

At the fifth conference in our Visual Learning conference series, held on November 14–15, 2014, altogether 36 papers were presented, with submissions having passed a blind peer-review process. The papers selected and written up for inclusion in the present volume again underwent blind peer-reviewing. Ultimately, the volume consists of twenty-three edited chapters, arranged into five sections.

The first section, Image, Metaphor, Symbol, opens with Philipp Stoellger's paper "Living Images and Images We Live By". As Stoellger makes it explicit, speaking of images we live by of course evokes the conceptual metaphor theory of Lakoff and Johnson. However, and this is a main point Stoellger emphasizes, the conceptual pattern investigated by Lakoff and Johnson should not be merely reconstructed in *language*, i. e. in metaphorical concepts, but also in images – as Stoellger puts it, in *iconic concepts*. "We live by" will then "no longer only mean 'we speak' by", but "*perceive*, *act, behave*, *evaluate*, *think*, *and feel* by". The second chapter in this section, by Zoltán Kövecses, systematically compares the phenomena of *metaphor* and *parable* within the framework of conceptual metaphor theory. The author's major goal is "to examine whether we can regard parable as a kind of metaphor and, more generally, to examine the cognitive status of parables". The conclusion he reaches is that, from the perspective of his chosen framework, "parables can be regarded as non-prototypical cases of conceptual metaphors". Conceptual metaphor theory provides the framework for the next chapter, too: "Metaphorical Eternity in Action: The Nonlinguistic Realization of

Death Metaphors in Iranian Culture", by Mohsen Bakhtiar. Significantly, rather than focusing on the *linguistic* manifestations of death metaphors, Bakhtiar puts emphasis on how conceptual metaphor contributes to and structures specific *actions*. With the last chapter in this section, Karolina Golinowska's "The Art of Memory Politics: Visual Learning – Visual Resisting", we leave the domain of the metaphor, and enter that of the symbolic. Not all historical memories and visual symbols, Golinowska explains, become part of "societal memory", forging individual identity. It is "political memory" that "dictates the thought patterns and limits the social processes of commemorating and forgetting".

The second section, Text and Image, begins with the chapter "The Iconic Surplus in Visual Arguments", by Tobias Schöttler. Visual arguments, shows Schöttler, have obvious limits but also unique potentials, with limits and potentials as it were presupposing and implying each other. By adopting this perspective, Schöttler stresses, the standard objections against visual arguments can be relativized or dissolved. The next chapter, by Lieven Vandelanotte, "'More Than One Way at Once': Simultaneous Viewpoints in Text and Image", argues that what we loosely call a "viewpoint" refers to a gamut of aspects: viewpoints are "inherently multimodal: beyond viewpoint in language, we also embody viewpoint in terms of our vision, gesture, body posture, direction of gaze, mental simulation, and so on". Vandelanotte provides some fascinating examples of the possible interconnections in play here, highlighting "viewpoint" as a specific cognitive phenomenon. The visual, then, can essentially add to texts not only when it comes to arguments, but also, and this really meets the eye, when it comes to defining a perspective. And it conspicuously adds to texts when it comes to making discoveries, both in the practice of cutting-edge science and in the practice of pedagogy. The latter is the topic of Matthew Crippen's paper "Pictures, Experiential Learning and Phenomenology". Exploiting Merleau-Ponty's notion of "lived experience", Crippen emphasizes the role of "motor-practical visual exercise" and indeed of the "motor-body" as underlying all cognitive activity. Merleau-Ponty and the idea of the motor are very much at the centre also of the chapter "Do We Have a Visual Mind?" by Zsuzsanna Kondor. Discussing the notions of embodied cognition, sensorimotor capabilities, and in particular *gestures*, Kondor arrives at the conclusion that at a basic level, as she puts it, "we have not so much a visual, but rather a *motor* mind". A much-discussed author both Kondor and – in the next chapter in this section – Jelena Issajeva take issue with, is Zenon Pylyshyn. Issajeva's subject is mental imagery, and what she argues for is that a mental image is neither "a picture in the head", as in the imagery debate most notably Stephen Kosslyn suggested, nor "a string of language-like thoughts", as Pylyshyn believed, but rather

"a complex system of signs and their properties" in the sense of semiotician and philosopher Peirce's theory of icon, index and symbol. The chapter "The Semiotics of Images: Photographic Conventions in Advertising", by Irma Puškarević and Uroš Nedeljković, aims at contributing to an analytical methodology of the visual image, specifically discussing the role of "social semiotics" and addressing "the shift of focus in meaning research from the 'given' to 'possible' meaning". Peirce's theory is taken up again in the last chapter of this section, the paper "Augmenting Conceptualization by Visual Knowledge Organization" by András G. Benedek, focussing on the issues of externalizing conceptual knowledge in visual forms, the coevolution of human cognition and external information carriers, and the interplay of word and image.

The next section in our volume, the section Images and the Challenge of the Internet, opens with Ágnes Veszelszki's chapter "Emoticons vs. Reaction-Gifs". Veszelszki strives to analyze a new form of web-based nonverbal intercourse. She first provides an overview of some fundamental assumptions of linguistic research on digital communication, then goes on to show different possibilities of expressing emotions on the internet, and closes by presenting the results of an empirical research on reaction-gifs. The chapter by Andrea Balogh and Zsolt Szántó, "The Changing Appearance of Text and Images on Online Interfaces", points out that while earlier on the internet it was characteristically possible to send texts only, today software enables one to send messages containing both text and picture. The authors examine if there is a specific relation between the chosen topic and the form of the message with regard to the online interface used. The challenge of the internet is discussed from an educational point of view in the chapter "Visual Learning – Picture and Memory in Virtual Worlds", by György Molnár and Zoltán Szűts, arguing that virtual worlds, fundamentally relying on the iconic turn, may carry the risk of causing a kind of digital dementia. Learning in virtual worlds is visual and 3D-orientated, the new communication technologies can make the learning process more effective through visual elements, but it is still a question how much information in that process can really be coped with.

We come to the section Visual Rhetoric, beginning with the chapter by Petra Aczél, "Ingenious Rhetoric: The Visual Secret of Rhetoricality". Aczél proposes an encompassing frame for visionary rhetoric, the communicative faculty that binds together seeing and knowing, perceiving and persuading. Her paper takes note of the inherent visual nature of rhetoric by focusing on the pictorial and imaginative capacities of verbal communication. Drawing on ancient and contemporary philosophers, she insists on reintroducing rhetoric as an originally visual and thus immediate and inspiring human symbolic action. Eszter Deli's

chapter, "Media Argumentation: A Novel Approach to Television Rhetoric and the Power of the News", suggests news to be construed as *argumentative units*. While the main objectives of media argumentation are, clearly, to persuade, to have an impact, and of course to gain the goodwill of the audience, Deli believes that it is possible to introduce a new focus to the field, by regarding media argumentation as a specific *social scene*. The chapter "Paradoxical Representation of Tropes in Visual Rhetoric", by Gabriella Németh, applies representation theory to provide, as the author puts it, "a common platform to semiotic and rhetorical approaches". The empirical part of her study points to various different structures of pictures and pictorial elements bound up with internet memes, while the theoretical part establishes connections between the visual application of rhetorical tropes and strategies, visual literacy, convergence, and participatory culture. The last chapter of this section, "Visual Rhetoric Used in Mapping Natural Language Arguments", by Gábor Forgács, discusses some visual representations of argumentative structures. Forgács suggests that argument diagrams are as it were a form of hypertext, analyzable with the instruments of cognitive linguistics. He argues that "the actual visual layout of natural language arguments can have effects of non-rational persuasion on the viewer". In argument mapping "a layer of visual rhetoric" is added to the visual reconstruction of argument patterns.

This volume's last section, Philosophy and the Limits of Language, opens with a chapter by Paul Boghossian. Under the title "Seemings: Sensory and Intellectual" Boghossian argues that while visual states, and perceptual states generally, can be seen as coming "already equipped with a particular propositional content", the question should be examined whether "in addition to sensory seemings or presentations, there are *intellectual* seemings or presentations". What we face here, points out Boghossian, is the traditional question of *intuitions*, and his position is that ultimately "we cannot do without appeal to a notion of intuition in the theory of knowledge". In his paper he outlines the most important challenges to the notion of intuition, and indicates how he believes we can respond to them. Boghossian's essay is followed by two chapters on Kant and two on Wittgenstein. The first of these, Mojca Küplen's "Cognitive Function of Beauty and Ugliness in Light of Kant's Theory of Aesthetic Ideas", takes issue with the customary philosophical distinction between aesthetic value and cognitive value, a distinction based on the view that aesthetic experience depends on the feeling of pleasure or displeasure, and that feelings are essentially non-cognitive. The chapter "Kant's Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience", by Andrija Šoć, starts out from the Kantian claim that genuine aesthetic judgments must be valid for everyone, but are also merely subjective. Kant here, Šoć insists, has not stated anything incoher-

ent. As Šoć writes: "The ultimate justification of our normative expectation that others in our position *ought* to make the same aesthetic judgment with respect to some object we judged beautiful, and thus the universality of both its validity and the communicability of our inner state, lies … in the fact of our transcendental uniformity", pertains, that is, precisely, to the uniformity of our cognitive powers. Of the two chapters on Wittgenstein, the one by Monika Jovanović, "The Thread and the Chain: 'Family Resemblances' and the Possibility of Non-Essentialist Conceptual Structure", explains why it is not the case that every concept needs to have strictly determined application conditions; why, as Wittgenstein has shown, the common-sense perspective, according to which there is a crucial relation between the concept of a certain thing and essential characteristics of that thing, is false. A perhaps complementary view is taken by the final chapter in the volume, Kristóf Nyíri's "Wittgenstein and Common-Sense Philosophy". As Nyíri puts it, Wittgenstein in his later years came close to developing a philosophy of visual thinking, thereby vindicating the common-sense view according to which we think in images no less than in words, with both mental and physical images signifying by resembling. Nyíri believes that the later Wittgenstein actually tended to be a philosopher of common sense.

Let me, at this point, thank Kristóf Nyíri in his capacity as my co-editor. I am indebted to him for seeing the volume, as also the previous volumes of the Visual Learning series, through the press. And a remark: in this series we do not generally follow the convention of indicating, for internet references, the date when authors last accessed the site they quote. Rather, each internet reference has been checked by the editors; all internet references contained in the present volume were valid at the time the Preface was written.

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Image, Metaphor, Symbol

Philipp Stoellger

Living Images and Images We Live By
What Does It Mean to Become a Living Image?

"The ability to feel one's own body image as a moving tactile image,
is the beginning of image competence."
John Michael Krois

1. Conceptual Remarks

At the beginning there is a need for some conceptual remarks about what an image *may be and do:*

1.1. Image as Visually Addressed Artefact

I follow a broad concept with reference to Alberti and Bredekamp[1], that an image is not only *art*, but is always "*manipulated* nature", like shells that are used for jewelry or as little sculptures. The artificial processing and a certain use transform the shell into an image. Whenever something is shown, presented or exposed, it *becomes* an image. Such a broad concept needs further distinctions of course: from visibility to iconicity to pictures and images in a more narrow sense. But nevertheless: a certain use and a certain perception makes something to become an image.

As a conceptual frame one may say: an image is a visual artefact, a *visually addressed artefact* made for perception, for bodily perception and body-experience (not only for a bodiless eye). I. e. images always are embodied and addressed as well to embodied receptions.

Thereby anything that is visible can become an image, furthermore: what is shown becomes an image. For example, every one of us wakes up in the morning in a special mode of appearance – and after some minutes or hours in the bathroom one gets out with another appearance: cleaned and dressed for self-presentation. The artificial processing transforms us into an image.[2] Therefore one may distinguish on the one hand natural appearance and on the other artificial

1 Horst Bredekamp, *Theorie des Bildakts*, Frankfurter Adorno-Vorlesungen 2007, Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 2010.

2 By the way: the ordinary use of "image", like the "image of a rock star" or "of a banker", points in this direction as well: the design of "our nature" makes an image out of us.

presentation going as far as "monstration" in further images (like selfies or other picture-usage in media).

1.2. Images Show and Hide

What *does* an image do? It is not saying or speaking but showing. We don't read, but see and perceive it. *Images* are media of showing (more than of saying). I accept the "iconic difference" (with Gottfried Boehm), not as a bad alternative between words and images, but to draw a distinction of saying and showing.

- Images *show*,
- they show *something* (as something for somebody),
- they show *themselves* (are exposed),
- they *are shown and used*, so that something can be shown by them,
- they can as well *show how they show* and *what it means to show* (re-entry, self-reflective),
- and at any rate they *hide a lot*, because to show means at the same time to hide "all the rest" (exclude all other possibilities). To show is de facto a highly exclusive selection, of course.

The objection that *images* do *not* show, but are only *used* to show *something*, seems to me to be a shortening, neither necessary nor desirable. It would reduce the image to be only an instrument for the representation of something. Its own presence and power would be overlooked (or made invisible) by such a restriction.

Isn't it a reduction to claim that always and only persons are the agents using images for their own purposes? Of course, that is sometimes the case. However, institutions, communities, or impersonal structures are using images as well (what may be called image-processing). Images are not only objects or instrumental media of use but they are showing by themselves. They are not only instruments of personal agents.

But – if you call the images "agents" *in themselves* (image-act-theory, as does Horst Bredekamp), that might lead to difficulties. The objection of "animism" and "magic" comes up, if you don't perceive here the metaphorical mode of speech. But at any rate images are effective: not only effects created by agents, but *in themselves* effective (forceful and powerful). It is of course a metaphor to speak of images as "agents" in the political sphere, but to speak of them as a force or power sounds less strange: images like all media are intrinsically dynamic.

To frame this with the concept of showing: an image shows always more than one intends to show "by it". Even when used as an instrument of representation, it carries always more: further effects which one cannot simply dominate. This

"more" one may call its presence and performance. And one of these effects is the so-called "immersion", or immersive effects.

1.3. Power of Monstration

One may call the power and performance of showing *monstration* (in difference to appearance).[3] An image appears as a phenomenon. It shows (in) "itself" and appears in the horizon of the spectator. If it is *used* for some purpose it becomes a monstration, for example to show what is said in a lecture or lesson or of what is written in a newspaper. Illustrations function as monstrational images, which are dominated by the writer's purposes. Thereby monstrations can produce "monsters": an execution "in effigie" for example, if a President is shown as the eternal loser, or "the other" as a monster – cases of enemies which are created by image-politics.

The power of images is the *power of an appearance* (to widen the horizon, to make something visible, etc.) as well as the *power of monstration*. When both are joined together I call it in German: *Deutungsmacht* (perhaps translated as power of interpretation or symbolic power).[4] "Deutungsmacht" is the power of showing, *lets* us see, *makes* us see something as something and perhaps even more: it can make us *feel and act* in accordance with the showing. The power of images then is power of transfiguration: it can change our perception and feelings, our orientation in life and our social interaction. That sounds strange or a little mysterious. The objection may be that it is always *us* who are changing our perception, etc. But – isn't it the case that images let and make us change our perception, thoughts and feelings? That's not an infallible performance of images, but it may happen.

The power of showing means: to let us see (something), to make us see that it *is*, as it is shown. To let us see, make us see – and make us feel, act, live – and even let us and make us believe – (in) the image. "Make us believe" sounds strange. Images as "belief-makers"? But I suppose *that this is* exactly their claim and challenge. They can make us believe in them and become believers.

Like the cunning snake Kaa in the Walt Disney adaptation of *The Jungle Book* is singing (the so called Python's Song): "Trust in me, just in me / Close your

3 To adopt a term recently revived by Daniel Dayan.

4 Cf. www.deutungsmacht.de. This is the page of the graduate school funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) since 2014. Cf. Philipp Stoellger (ed.), *Deutungsmacht: Religion und belief systems in Deutungsmachtkonflikten*, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014.

eyes and trust in me".[5] One may recognize Kaa as the metonymic incarnation of "the image" and its belief-claim. – And there is no general need for suspicion or rejection. Normally we love it to be hypnotized or at least to be fascinated by the image. That is why Hieronymus Bosch's "Garden of Earthly Delights" is an image about what an image is: it is the image of images. The delights *are* what it is to be and become an image.

The power of showing (Deutungsmacht) *is* the formation of beliefs (a belief system or belief cluster) and thereby it becomes a form of life (and *forms* our lives) – if we follow the "belief-claims" of images. But – how free are we in this regard? We can respond or react in this or that way. But the response is always later than the challenge. Once the eye is caught, there is an initial "lack of freedom". And normally we enjoy this captivity (in cinema, advertisement, or in art and religion as well). Often immersions are a joy and enjoyable loss of freedom.

One example for the strange powers of images is, *what is seen, cannot be made unseen.* It "catches" the eye – and the eye will forever be caught. You can close sight, but the seen will remain seen forever. And even more: usually we cannot *not* believe in what we see. Of course we know about manipulation, but this objection comes always belatedly. The "first glance" and first impression dominates all the rest (I'm afraid …). It is a kind of magic and can be explained by physiology and psychology of course. But – the effect in itself still remains a little magical. In that what we *say* the other does not immediately believe in. To follow a piece of advice, is still open and contingent. The power of words is weaker than the one of images. At first glance we cannot not believe and not react and not follow them.

On the one hand, images are exemplifications of a belief system (to speak with Goodman). On the other hand, they offer this exemplification to let us or make us participate in this belief system. Images are communicative media of beliefs (and of faith and forms of life). They do not only *represent* a belief-system like a form of life, but they *are* a part of it. In an image as exemplification of a form of life, the belief system is "really present". What "real presence" may mean is shown in and by an image.

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5 "Hold still please / Trust in me, just in me / Close your eyes and trust in me / We can sleep safe and sound / Knowing I am around – Slip into silent slumber / Sail on a silver mist / Slowly but surely / Your senses will cease to resist – Trust in me, just in me / Shut your eyes and trust in me / You can sleep safe and sound / Knowing I am around" (written by Milton Ager – Ned Wever – Jean Schwartz).

1.4. Images as Media in Media

Images are special media, because they are "media in media". They appear and they are "given" not "as such", but always in different medialities: may it be in thought, in memory and imagination, in language and speech, in different materialities like "on the screen" or projected "onto a wall", in "canvas" or in three dimensions like sculptures and bodies. Images *have* "their body" and *are* embodied – and bodies appear as images as well (if they are of manipulated nature: monstrations of ourselves, and sometimes little monsters).

John Michael Krois told us: "Embodiment makes thought logically vague, but it also makes thought possible", and furthermore: "The ability to feel one's own body image as a moving tactile image, is the beginning of image competence."[6] *Embodiment* in a programmatic sense cannot mean simply that something once bodiless is embodied or embodies itself, as immaterial ideas were supposed to be imprinted in matter. An image does not *become* embodied but it *is* ineluctably embodied. In analogy to Hans Blumenberg's "absolute metaphor" this could be called "absolute embodiment", i. e. it cannot be reduced to anything previously or subsequently bodiless. As men cannot be thought of as bodiless, images are never bodiless either.

Krois's thesis on the origin of image-competence and his studies on the basic meaning of corporeality in perception indicate embodiment on the side of the perceiver and the side of the perceived. As far as he considers (referring to Cassirer) the "expression" to be the fundamental phenomenon, the meaning of expression is always constitutionally *sensual* and for all living beings this means that it is "corporeal". The theme of embodiment poses a challenge to comprehend image perception as a *bodily* event, similar to accessing iconic artefacts in religion and likewise in "art scene". In the phenomenological tradition one speaks of "kinaesthesis" as the moving corporeal perception (in difference to a bodiless and motionless eye). Then the image-perception as kinaesthetic is a body-interaction between perceivers and images: they are moving around each other. Images we live with and by can be understood as the continuation of this approach.

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6 John Michael Krois, "Bildkörper und Körperschema", in Krois, *Körperbilder und Bildschemata: Aufsätze zur Verkörperungstheorie ikonischer Formen*, ed. by Horst Bredekamp et al., Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2011, pp. 253–271, this passage on p. 271; cf. John Michael Krois, "Einleitung in: Edgar Wind. Heilige Furcht", in Krois, *Körperbilder und Bildschemata*, pp. 25–42.

1.5. Image-Ontology: Between Presence and Representation

What "*is*" an image? That's a question of an image-*ontology* (if you like it or not). Usually the answer is: an image is *not* what it shows. The reason for the negative answer is the model of "representation". If an image is used to represent something, it *is* not what is shown by itself. That's trivial. But that is not the whole story of the image. Of course the image of a grape *is not* a grape but an image of a grape. But an image is *not nothing*. It may not be what it *represents*, but it is what it *presents*: an image, an event of appearance and monstration, an embodiment. My answer is: the image *is and is not* (like Ricoeur's metaphor combines "is and is not"). It is not what it represents, but is what it presents.

That is the reason why "representation" alone is not quite sufficient to understand an image. It is always an intermediation or *chiasm of representation and presence*. It can be mainly a representation, but nevertheless an event of presence. And it can be mainly an event of presence, but nevertheless at the same time a bit of a representation.

An image in an advertisement for example may represent a product, often metonymical with marvellous glamour, a Porsche with the "fitting" glamorous female (just to give a trivial example). And the advertisement calculates the interference of the represented car and female. Buy one, get both. Or it calculates the emotional interaction: it transfers the desire from one to the other. That is *not only a game of representation* (showing something), but such an image-use intends to *make present* what it represents: to make you feel and believe and act in accordance to the image-claim. I. e. even such a "weak" image like in advertisements has an impact of presence and event, a performance to make you *follow* its claim.

The relation or better say chiasm of *is and is not* is a conceptual model. The concrete decision about the relation of presence and representation is to be made in regard to the concrete image, its context, reception and performance. The *use* of an image decides about the relation of is and is not.

For example the central "devotional image" in Christianities is the "host": *the* cultic image. For Catholics and Lutherans it *is*, what it shows: Christ himself (Christus praesens). It is claimed to be real presence: a belief claim of this ritually living image, dependent of course on the belief of the participants. That means this image *is*, what it shows, only in its *use*, not in itself. It perishes in the moment of use and after it. But as this image is "consumed", as it is fading away, it transforms or transfigures the consumer: to become the next embodiment of what is shown, i. e. to become the Christian form of life.

For Reformed (like Zwingli and Calvin) the "bread" is nothing but a sign, no presence but only representation for preserving memory.[7] However, defining an image only as sign and representation, is an iconoclastic concept. It is as an embodiment and ritual, including the participants in the vivid image, always a mode of presence and has the option of immersion: becoming present, what it shows and what it *is*.

Coming back to image-ontology: Images are not only media of representation, but always also media of presence and the presence of media. The relation of representation (is not) and presence (is) depend on each other – and it is a question of perspective, use and perception. My suggestion for image-hermeneutics is: to *look for the "presence-claim"* of each image as a *belief-claim* (Trust in me, just in me!). Through this claim – if it is followed – the image becomes "vivid" and "alive". It becomes more than an instrument but an interaction or a driving force in visual cultures we live in. That is why image-design and use seek for "animation", as if the image got a "soul" whereby its body would become "alive".

But such "animation" is not only, not even mainly, in the hand of designers and promoters of images. It is not only a feature of the image in itself either. Animation is a claim or pretension, which longs for "ratification": for sharing this claim and corresponding to the demand. The force and power are not at least "user-relative". The claim for animation (as for power) originally lacks ratification through the addressees. It is *us* who fulfil the claim and "give life" to the images. But – is it only and originally "us" by whom the images live? Living images as animations by their users?

The intriguing "thrust reversal", the strange inversion of movement is: animated images live in themselves as the intrinsic dynamic of media shows. Then the living images vice versa animate users and addressees. There is a back and forth, a kind of reciprocal exchange of animation between "us" and "the images".[8]

They live by us – and we live by them.

They live by us, *if* we live by them.

And if *not* – do they remain lifeless? I don't think so. They nevertheless remain alive: Their presence-claim remains open, but it still remains. The iconocritic and iconoclastic traditions (either Platonic or Jewish) claim that images are "dead", mere shadows or even worse: diabolic and demonic. Why and whence? I suppose that it is the (uncanny) power of images, the power to be alive – in an ambiguous

7 But let us add – memory is never "only" memory. It's a form of presence of the past.

8 Is it just *exchange* or a kind of double *gift* of life? That would be a question of further distinction of exchange and gift.

way. The image is *not dead*. But the image is not alive like human beings either. It is something "in between" or beyond the distinction of life and death.

2. Cognitive Iconology?

What might happen if we live *by* an image? Speaking of images we live by of course evokes the conceptual metaphor theory of Lakoff and Johnson, carried on, notably, by the investigations Zoltán Kövecses has since pursued. And that's of course a horizon of research which is groundbreaking. But – from a phenomenological and hermeneutical point of view I take the risk of having some doubts and differences.

The entire conceptual orientation, developed by Lakoff/Johnson, can *not* only be reconstructed in *language*, i. e. in metaphorical concepts, but also in images: let's say in *iconic concepts*. The consequence would be that we need further investigations in *cognitive iconology* (or iconicity). Thereby, cognitive *semantics* would no longer be the basis, instead we would rather speak of cognitive *pragmatics and mediality*. "We live by" meant in Lakoff/Johnson a system of language, because of their semantic system. That can be transformed into a pragmatistic frame: "we live by" would no longer only mean "we speak" by, but we *perceive*, *act, behave*, *evaluate*, *think*, *and feel* by.

One main point in Lakoff/Johnson was that the *conceptual* frame was decisive: the metaphorical concepts are in the last instance only *concepts*. The metaphors seem to be "only" a linguistic mode of speech and thought. The same would be the consequence for iconic concepts: they would be, in the last analysis, mere concepts. And the whole story would be only about *concepts we live by*. That is of course possible and would be enlightening as well.

We live by i. e. we orient our life in line with iconic concepts (as with metaphorical concepts). Then it is possible to develop a field of conceptual differences, represented in and by images. Like in conceptual metaphor theory one may grasp concepts like sky and earth, heaven and hell, paradise and everyday life, the lights of life and its dark sides. *We live in and by differences* by which we orientate ourselves. However these differences are not bare and abstract, but mostly given in and by images and imaginations. Even more: the named differences and concepts are belated abstractions of the images we live by.

We do not only live by concepts, at least not only by cognitive ones. The problem I see here is that of *conceptual reduction*: reducing images to basic concepts would intend to make them lose their power and performance in themselves as embodied image-events. Then an image would be a means to an end, an instrument for teaching or memory for example. That's a possible, but not the full-fledged concept of an image – to teach and visualize abstract ideas. It is more an

event of visual interaction (and interpassion) than an instrument of representation. In accordance to image-ontology: the presence and power of the image *as image* would be reduced to a means of representation.

That is why images are not *only representations*. Sometimes they are figures of presence, of *effective* and *real presence*. "Love and hate" for example are not abstract concepts, which are secondarily "set" into an image, to raise some concreteness. Such a model of abstract concepts, which may be turned into metaphors and images, seems to be not a misplaced concreteness, but *misplaced abstraction*. The concepts come in later than the phenomena, and the phenomena are the experiences, their presence in memory and imagination and therefore their life-world-communication in images and metaphors. Likewise the "absolute" metaphor is not reducible to concepts,[9] the "absolute" image, i. e. its absoluteness is that images are not the belated illustration of concepts, but vice versa: the concrete presence of image (and imaginations) is original and before their "propositional content" is reduced into concepts.

Therefore the main idea of "cognitive semantics" may be *inverted*: The idea was that there are at first cognitive concepts – we live by. And these concepts are communicated and transferred in metaphors. Therefore we live by metaphors as secondary means to an end. But the dominance of cognitive concepts and at last the reducibility of metaphors to these concepts – is a bit *too cognitive*, too much semantics. The inversion, I suggest, is: pragmatics is more basic than semantics; metaphors are more basic than their conceptual reductions; and images are the basic media of communication and orientation in life.

For pedagogics as for religion, concepts are of course important, but they are belated reductions and clarifications of what is given and made in embodied communication: metaphorical, parabolic, narrative modes of speech, full of memory and imagination. The metaphors are original and more basic than the cognitive concepts. But – if one follows the primacy of cognitive concepts, most of the communication seems to be *saying*, as in speech and texts. And that would be just half of the story: equally relevant (and perhaps even more?) is *showing* and that means: *image-practice*. The "iconic mediality" of communication is irreducible to "words".

Images usually are seen to be only an image, not the real thing. Take the concept of justice for example. The image of justice *is* not justice, of course: like "Justitia" in front of a court *is* not justice, but only an image. And what may happen inside the court is only law (hopefully), not justice. However, the *experience* of justice

9 Cf. Hans Blumenberg against the substitution theory of metaphors.

is "the real thing". But how do we experience it? Do we experience a concept? I suppose that we experience certain "incarnations", embodiments of justice – if that happens. The religious or secular "saints": may it be Francis or Luther, Martin Luther King or Bonhoeffer are such embodied images of justice. The point is: the bodily experience and the visible embodiment are the bases; the concept comes later. But – usually it is the experience of the *lack* of justice (this point is central in messianic traditions). Then the same form of experience is present: presence of injustice. *Against* this lack we live by images of hope and justice. Otherwise we would end up in despair.

That's a decisive difference to economic image-techniques: The cultural "labels" in economy are like "heraldic" or "emblematic" techniques. Apple's "bitten apple" is a label with emblematic resonance: the beginning of discovery and cognition. It does not label the fall of man, the origin of sin, but the origin of cognition and knowledge. There is a *promise* in such labels: that the labelled product *is* what is promised by the image. The model is: what is promised *is* what you get. But of course – economy and politics always promise more than they could ever keep. They are professional in *empty promising* – in producing power out of the void.

But how do such miracles work? Of course there are media techniques like image-politics: the presentation of images as images of the meaning of life, of salvation or glory and glamour. But all image-politics depends on the ratification through the addressee, i. e. by "us". *Our* belief is necessary for the life of such images. They are "animated" by our desires and will to believe. And this desire and will is the origin of the wonderful transformation (or miraculous transubstantiation) of the images in living images, of the void into power. The will to believe in images brings them to life.

Then the enlightenment argument is close: Get away with your will to believe. Rely on scepticism as a freeing force of liberation. But – I suspect that the will to believe *nothing*, really nothing anymore, follows the same model: the deeper will to believe nothing is as well a will to believe – but just nothing. I suspect that there is no escape – no exit from the cave, no final freedom of images.

And that is not a pity, that is simply *culture*, visual culture and culture of memory and imagination. And please have no regrets: we cannot escape from cultural mediality. It is not a pity, it's *humanity*: human life *in and with* images. The general hermeneutics of suspicion against images is in itself void and self-deceptive. It follows the (negative) imagination that there may be a life without any possibility of deception. And that is in itself a deception.

3. Images We Live *With – In – For – By*

We live in an iconic environment, in a world of worlds of images. There is no need for a generalized suspicion against it. The old objection of deception is a little self-deception. What we cannot avoid we had better not to reject in general. Instead of generally rejecting, there is a need for distinction and clarification – of image-competence.

One reason for the dissatisfaction and objection to our iconic environment may be the following: *What we see is rarely what we get.* There is not only an iconic difference but even more an *iconic gap*, a lack of fulfilment and of identity of the seen and the given. What we see is rarely what we get. But this gap is not only a *lack*, but also the origin of a *dynamic* and cultural movement. It's one of the driving forces of our culture: to get what we see, and to see what we (will) get. There is a deep desire (not only in "man" but in culture) of "immediacy", of identity in the medium and the mediated: of the taught and the learned, of the lover and the loved, of wishes and reality – and so forth. To get it, really, immediately and directly, is not only an economic model of promise – of always broken promise. It is, rather, an anthropological pattern of identity, fulfilment and immediacy. In religion it's present as the desire for salvation, reconciliation, at-one-ment or reunion. Hence, the *lack* of fulfilment becomes a *force* in cultural mediality: either the media are under suspicion to be only media, blamed for not being identical with the mediated (the promised). Or the media become the mediated: the desire of identity is transferred to the media themselves. This antagonism is the medial root of the conflicts about images: iconoclasts and iconodules.

The images we live *with* in our environment can turn into objects of desire (not only of needs and demands), and not only objects, but also exemplifications and expressions. They become embodied metaphors and metonymies of cultural desires. A desire denotes a longing for identity and fulfilment (the old Platonic dream). However, desires in themselves include a "lack" and a remaining "difference": as there is no foreseeable fulfilment, a desire is a never-ending longing (in contrast to needs and demands). Such images of desire are quite powerful. They can be compared to fields of cultural gravitation, they make us revolve around them. They make us live not only with, but *for* and *by* them.

In this regard there is a need for further research and basic distinctions:

1. Images we live *with* are all the images we see, saw, have seen until now (and will see): the *iconic environment.*
2. Images we live *in* are all the images we are "in", we use and which are part of our life, taken for granted and self-evident (like Husserl's "Universum der Selbstverständlichkeit"): it's the *iconic life-world we live in.*

3. Images we live *for* are more important: they are the cultural "idols" we desire and live for, like ideas of success or glory, of general social acceptance or better of salvation and justification in regard to God and the neighbour.
4. I suppose that images we live *for* are different to images we live *by*, because the idols and ideals we live for are in a way "outer" appearances: like obligations or social conventions. Images we live *by* are even different. Some images are the "chosen ones", which are the "ultimate concerns" for our life. They are emotionally charged. They frame our perspective "from within". Since they are concern-based, they rule our construals.
5. Images we live by (and we can die with) become more or less images we live *as*. Because we *become* living images in following them, living by them and therefore as an embodiment of them.

If we live by them, we can die with them. Such images may be as strong as death.[10] That would be the ultimate test: are the images we live by so strong that we can die with them? The alternative is quite usual: what we live for, we die for. We give our life for idols and ideals. And that may be quite right and honest. And also what we live *by*, can become what we *die* by. Image performance can be deadly: there are not only living images, but also killing ones. We do not always know in advance what the performance of the image will be. Images need to be used and tested, for us to become aware of their performance. Do they stand the test of time – of life and death at last?

Take for example images we do live for and by: images of wellness, welfare and common goods – or more private goods? – images of justice, freedom and humanity. They are concrete and given in certain images as embodied expressions. The Christian traditions are full of images of *true* justice, *true* freedom and *true* humanity: Christ himself and all the saints and hopefully as well all Christians. The enlightenment traditions in Europe looked for "secular" alternatives or supplements for this image-tradition. But, Christianity goes even a step further: there is not only justice, but *more* than justice, not only a new law, but *the other of law* (called Gospel): similar to the Samaritan who does not fulfil the law but who is an embodiment of the love of neighbour.

To live *by* certain images implies a choice: by *which* we *want* to live. Such a choice is mostly already done by tradition, like the political system or religion we

10 Cf. Philipp Stoellger, "The Image – As Strong as Death? On Death as the Origin of the Image", in Klaus Sachs-Hombach and Jörg R. J. Schirra (eds.), *Origins of Pictures: Anthropological Discourses in Image Science*, Köln: Herbert von Halem Verlag, 2013, pp. 460–489.

live in. But nevertheless there is also a quest for actual choice by each of us: which images do we follow and in how far and how do we follow them? Which images do we take as an orientation? Individualization means we cannot *not* choose for ourselves. We may like *delegation*, i. e. to delegate the choice to tradition, authorities and "models" of a "good" and successful life. But – in the end, we cannot not choose for ourselves. Still, the model of "choice" is a little "economistic", as if we were in the situation of "rational choice", calculating the price and choosing this, not that. The usual situation seems to be that "there *was* a choice" and most of it has already been *chosen*, by tradition, family, former life, etc.

Therefore I suggest that we have to take at least the *responsibility* for the images we live by and orient our life by. It is quite usual that certain national, regional, cultural, religious traditions are collections of *given* images, inherited and "already there". Of course we live *in* these traditions. However, we cannot carry out orders blindly, we have to reflect on them – at least, to be able to take the responsibility for what we do. A normative question arises: By which images do we orient our life? *Image-competence implies image-responsibility as well.* I don't want to moralize, but how and which images are used (or better not), is obviously a normative question: in the press and the new media – as well as in our own lives.

4. Images We Live *As*: *Living Images*

What happens if we live by an image? That is the question that has still remained open. *We become an image* – might be the response. It frames our form of life, and thereby we become the medium of real presence of the image: its "body" of further life. Thus, embodiment is not only a question of images (like sculptures or pictures). And it is not only a question of anthropology. But both are to be intertwined in the model of a chiasm.

The image we live by becomes the image we live as. The image we live by – *makes us become an image*, not only a representation, but more a living presence of it. That is the impact and performance of the chosen ones, the images we live by.

To give an example: In Christianity the central image cult is the Eucharist, the consumption of a little image named host. A usual question focuses on the so-called "transubstantiation" of bread into flesh, and the answer is given in Aristotelian substance-ontology. To phrase it in terms of contemporary models: "hoc est corpus meum" becomes the speech-act, by which an image-act is constituted. But if you eat the host, consume it, then is it "in-side of you"? Where is the performance and where is the power? My response would be, *we shall become, what we consumed*: the image of Christ. That's the promise, the "promissio", never broken by the present Christ. That means, the *real* miracle and mystery is not in the

substance of bread and wine, but the transubstantiation of the image-consumers. I suppose it is better to say *transfiguration*. The host, the image as a small embodiment of Christ, becomes the medium of Christ's spirit. And in the social celebration we hope to be transfigured: made into a "figura" of his spirit. "No more miracle" – one may argue. But that's it: to become the image we live by (and can die with). The image we live by becomes the image we live as. And the promise is, that's a new, an eternal life.

I suppose that the presence-claim of (certain) images, of the images we live *by,* is: to become present in us and by us, i. e. that we become their body, our life as embodiment of the image's presence. The image we live by – becomes the image we live as. That's of course a strange interference or interaction: a kind of reduplication and repetition of the image. It transforms or transfigures us, our life – and thereby we are transfigured by it. But for all that: isn't it *us* who are choosing and transforming? What is the "driving force"? And what is going on in the moment we are becoming a living image?

Perhaps an analogy is helpful. We are used to the idea of "language competence" or "language mastery". We master our language, and perhaps even more, foreign languages. But who is mastering whom there? Isn't it *us*, who are mastered by the language we believe to master? We like to see media as "our slaves", as obedient instruments. By inverting the perspective, self-deception becomes visible there. But inversion is not the response I am looking for. The media as the master and we as the slaves? The so-called "dispositives" as the hidden masters of culture – and men as obedient slaves? Is this an idea in line with Foucault? I am not quite sure – and together with Bartleby "I would prefer not to…". The interesting interference is not the inversion of the "master–slave" model but a certain *undecidability*. Who is able to decide there?

Living images are *animated and animating.* The strange life of such images is to live by us – and to give life as well – and vice versa. One may speak of animated animators and animating animators. Here the undecidability becomes intriguing: on the one hand such an image is vivid; on the other hand "we" are vivid images as well. Because we do not only live with and in images, we live *as* images. The living image develops a twofold meaning: living images and living as images.

Traditionally we imagine ourselves as subjects or persons, as "authentic": look at me, trust in me, that's "me". But we always "show" ourselves in the twofold meaning of presence and representation, in roles with masks. Human life is life in masks. Goffman would say: we live in social roles "on stage". But the idea that behind the roles there is an "I" or really authentic "self", different to all roles, is already an image of ourselves which is imagined. *We make* and draw this distinc-

tion to produce an inner "I" as a sovereign about and above all roles. One may think so and live with this image of the self.

Remind yourself of Freud: who is the sovereign? In the end, nobody, because our "self" is a complex of "layers", playing their role in our "self". As Rimbaud asked – Who is me? Who is speaking, whenever "I" speak? Who is writing? Who is living? In order not to put it in a dogmatic frame I would simply hesitate over and refrain from thinking that there is an immediate and authentic identity behind all layers or roles. The difference drawn is already an image (or idea) of our self – which is constituted by drawing this distinction. *Who* is drawing or making the distinction then? Is there no sovereign self that *mak*es this difference? Of course there is a distinction-drawer. But that is one self of our *self*, one layer in this complex.

One may expect that in religion (like in enlightenment philosophy) there should be the conviction vivid of a "solid soul" or authentic "I". But – whoever and whatever I may be is withdrawn from my introspection. What and who I am is, ultimately, not least God's judgment about "myself". What and who I am is a question of the relation to God. "Conversion" is such a model of "becoming a *new* image": to end the "old" life and live a "new" one. "To become an image"[11] can mean, to live another life: to live as *this* image as a form of life.

Take for example quite a classic image, the narrative image of the good Samaritan:

> He said unto him, What is written in the law? how readest thou? And he answering said, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy mind; and thy neighbour as thyself. And he said unto him, Thou hast answered right: this do, and thou shalt live. But he, willing to justify himself, said unto Jesus, And who is my neighbour? And Jesus answering said, A certain *man* went down from Jerusalem to Jericho, and fell among thieves, which stripped him of his raiment, and wounded *him*, and departed, leaving *him* half dead. And by chance there came down a certain priest that way: and when he saw him, he passed by on the other side. And likewise a Levite, when he was at the place, came and looked *on him*, and passed by on the other side. But a certain Samaritan, as he journeyed, came where he was: and when he saw him, he had compassion *on him*, And went to *him*, and bound up his wounds, pouring in oil and wine, and set him on his own beast, and brought him to an inn, and took care of him. And on the morrow when he departed, he took out two pence, and gave *them* to the host, and said unto him, Take care of him; and whatsoever thou spendest more, when I come again, I will repay thee. Which now of these three,

11 That can mean as well: to die, if death is the original image (with Maurice Blanchot). The concept of "conversion" plays with the metaphorical death of the old life (Saulus) and the origin of a new one (Paulus).

> thinkest thou, was neighbour unto him that fell among the thieves? And he said, He that shewed mercy on him. Then said Jesus unto him, Go, and do thou likewise (King James Bible translation, Luke 10:26–37).

The Samaritan is *the* unpopular foreigner, the stranger from the hated foreign religion. And it is him who does what is right: he and only he fulfils the command of love of your neighbour. And, by the way, *everyone* is your neighbour, because everyone is God's neighbour. In the *"original" context* (i. e. the historical reconstruction and its imagination) in the life of Jesus, the Samaritan may have been an image for the fulfilment of the command. In the *context of Luke's text* it becomes an indirect image of Jesus himself: he is the incarnation of love, the ideal Samaritan. In the *later use of the text*, the Samaritan became a narrative figure of the religious imagery: the image for orientation, the guiding intuition of what has to be done, if someone finds himself in a desperate plight and really needs help. And as time goes by the narrative figure became a cultural pattern, a figure of the cultural imagery, reaching right into legislation. However, it is needless to say that the legal requirement to render assistance is only an external obligation. We never become "living images" by law.[12] But it is remarkable that even our law is ruled by this intuition (remember the category "failure to perform the act of aiding").

And even late-modern democracies live *by* such images we live and survive by, which are "more than law". The roots of law are "beyond" law itself. The tacit dimension of democracy is based on images *by which* humans live together in a human way. And *in the name of such images* we demonstrate against the violation of democratic rules. That is: these images embody the leading intuitions of a culture: the cultural memory and imagination.

Some images become images we live and survive by, which can become present in and *as* one's life. There are religious as well as secular "saints", not only representing but making present, what they are: living images of justice or of love for example. They are little incarnations of the Samaritan, again and again. The cultural "fabrication" of saints is the production of living images. – As opposed to such "saints", stars and starlets in the world of glamour as well may be images we live with and perhaps for (mimetic desire). For some "groupies" they become "idols" they live for: imitation and mimesis may make them "followers". They live their lives as fans and imitators of their idols. The decisive question, though, is

12 But: perhaps the representatives of the executive, legislative and judiciary – may their life be the living image of "rule of law"? Aren't they obliged to "incarnate" the rule of law?

certainly: *what* is represented in such images and what becomes present when one lives *by* them? Which image do I become, whenever I live by them?

The meaning of life becomes *manifest* in the dominant images of one's life. Like the meaning of life a cultural field or milieu is manifest in their "saints" or idols. The media of the "cultural imagery" are images which are figures of orientation (in negative as well as positive regards: like friends and enemies, one's own and other one's).

Orientation has a usual "drive" to dualistic or at least binary models, like left and right, up and down. This drive is also dominant in the famous conceptual metaphor theory of Lakoff/Johnson. That seems to be a habit of thought and speech: either–or, left or right, right or wrong. But: this semantic and grammatical habit of thought can easily be misguiding. There is a need for anti-dualism: for *figures of the third,* for intermediations and for graduation and complexity. "The own" and "the foreign" for example are as intertwined as their differentiation is a process of "definition". Not only the foreign is "made", made as and by images. The own as well is the dependent function of image-production and -tradition.

But – what about "freedom"? Isn't there a clear distinction: free or not, freedom or submission and dependence? To give an example of protestant theology: The main idea of Reformation was an image of freedom, with Luther phrasing it as follows:

1. A Christian is a perfectly free lord of all, subject to none.
2. A Christian is a perfectly dutiful servant of all, subject to all.

He is completely free – by Christ, i. e. by the image of Christ and as his image. And therefore a Christian is so free as to be the "servant" of all. That means: responsibility for the other in and by freedom.

Compare this to the images of freedom one usually lives by: are we free enough to be responsible for the other, even for the enemy? Not only for us and "for freedom", but to become "servants" of others? For example, what would be the consequence for education or political communication? Isn't the sense and meaning of *true* freedom responsibility for the neighbour? Like for any other – culture and religion? Not only tolerance but "subservient" responsibility for his/her freedom and life? What a strange idea or what an absurd image of freedom. But that's it, what a Christian freedom claims. Christ as true image and a Christian life as embodiment of this image lives *as* this extraordinary image of true freedom: of freedom as love. And to live by this image is full of cultural and political consequences.

Because of this, let me close with a political remark. By *which* images we live, is a question of power – and thereby image-theory *is* political theory. Usually we live by *given* (pre-given) images: national traditions, religion, economy, etc. These

are images we are ruled by. But for all that, after careful deliberation, we may be able to choose or change the images we live by. There is an anarchic or at least democratic possibility of choice. The problem is one of distance: usually there is a kind of self-evidence at work, as if the images we are ruled by were images we would rule by. I. e. as if the given images were actively chosen ones. Like in language: as if the language we are ruled by were the language we master. That would be a coincidence of freedom and submission. That sounds paradoxical but is quite usual: when we believe to choose our images, we feel free, even or especially when we choose the pre-given images.

The Protestant freedom is no such submission, but similarly paradoxical: Christ as the image we live by and as is an image of freedom: an open challenge or better a promise with a presence-claim: are we free enough to be responsible for the other? Free enough to free the other, to be responsible for *his or her* freedom? This hints at *hospitality* growing out of freedom. And the limits of *hospitality* are also the limits of *our* freedom. – The question is which image of freedom we live by – and live as. Because we become the image we live by.